The long haul pdf

This page was last edited on 14 July 2017, the long haul pdf 15:12. 1956, became identified with the doctrine of “massive retaliation. United States with the nation’s financial resources. It was based on an extensive reappraisal of U.

Eisenhower and his closest advisers immediately following his election in November 1952. Eisenhower approved on October 30, 1953. Truman on September 30, 1950. Truman’s advisers believed that Soviet military capabilities would reach a maximum relative to those of the United States and its allies in the mid-1950s.

Eisenhower rejected the idea that one period would be any more dangerous than another and urged his planners to think in terms of a Soviet threat that was economic as well as military. He wanted to avoid, in his own words, “an unbearable security burden leading to economic disaster. Eisenhower was fearful that U. The first models were deployed just as the New Look took shape. Land and naval forces were cut.

Continental air defense was expanded. Although strategic air power attained a lower level than the Truman administration had projected, it became the centerpiece of U. The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing. Now the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff can shape our military establishment to fit what is our policy, instead of having to try to be ready to meet the enemy’s many choices. That permits of a selection of military means instead of a multiplication of means, As a result, it is now possible to get, and share, more basic security at less cost. What Dulles implied was that the United States was prepared to respond to a Soviet-backed conventional threat anywhere with a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union itself.